USA v. Boe Keenan by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-1-2019 
USA v. Boe Keenan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Boe Keenan" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 912. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/912 
This October is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-2600 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BOE KEENAN, 
    Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-15-cr-00226-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon  
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on January 24, 2019  
 
Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: October 1, 2019) 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
Appellant Boe Keenan appeals his sentence of 151 months’ imprisonment, 
contending that the District Court improperly designated him a career offender.  Finding 
no error, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence. 
   I 
 Keenan was charged with one count of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2113(a) in connection with a June 2015 incident in Wexford, Pennsylvania.  In 
February 2017, Keenan pleaded guilty to that count.  The District Court determined 
Keenan was a career offender and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 151 months 
to be followed by three years of supervised release.  
Keenan’s career offender enhancement was based on two prior convictions:  (1) 
his 2008 Pennsylvania conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under 18 
Pa. C.S. §2702(a)(4), and (2) his 2010 federal conviction for bank robbery by 
intimidation under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).  Keenan’s Guidelines range was calculated at 
151–188 months after accounting for his acceptance of responsibility.  
Prior to sentencing, Keenan objected to portions of the Presentence Investigation 
Report (PSR).  First, Keenan contended that he did not qualify as a career offender 
because his prior convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and bank 
robbery by intimidation did not qualify as crimes of violence.  Second, he argued for a 
downward departure or variance from the advisory Guidelines range because his career 
offender enhancement substantially over-represented the seriousness of his criminal 
history or the likelihood that he would commit other crimes and because a lower sentence 
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was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 
3553(a)(2). 
At sentencing, the District Court ruled that Keenan’s two prior convictions both 
qualified as predicates for a career offender enhancement.  The District Court denied 
Keenan’s request for a departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 and noted that nothing in the 
record supported a variance under § 3553(a).  Keenan raised a general objection that the 
sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable, specifically with respect 
to the career offender determination.  The District Court overruled the objection.   
 At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the IJ sentenced Keenan to 151 
months imprisonment.  Keenan did not object at that time to the career offender 
enhancement or to the failure to grant a variance.   
    Keenan appealed.  
II1 
Keenan contends the District Court procedurally erred by imposing a sentence 
within the Guidelines range2 and failing to respond to his argument to vary downward.  
Keenan claims his classification as a career offender was the anomalous result of his state 
court plea to a “lesser offense:”  second-degree aggravated assault under 18 Pa. C.S. 
§ 2702(a)(4), which categorically qualifies as a crime of violence.  However, the original 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
2 Keenan also argues the District Court wrongfully sentenced him under the career 
offender guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, insofar as unarmed bank robbery in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2113(a) is categorically not a “crime of violence.”  This argument was raised 
after the imposition of the sentence.  However, as defense counsel concedes, this 
argument is foreclosed by United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80, 88 (3d Cir. 2018).  
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charge, first-degree aggravated assault under 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(1), has been 
determined not to be a crime of violence.3  Keenan therefore believes that the District 
Court should have reduced his sentence.  
We review for plain error because this argument was not preserved.4  During the 
sentencing hearing, defense counsel mentioned the “anomaly” of the aggravated assault 
charge.  However, this objection was not raised at the time that the District Court 
pronounced its sentence.   
On plain error review,5 an appellant must demonstrate “that (1) there is a legal 
error; (2) the legal error is clear or obvious; (3) the error affected the appellant’s 
substantial rights such that it affected the outcome of district court proceedings; and (4) 
the error ‘seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.’”6  Keenan bears the burden at each step.7  
                                              
3 In 2008, Keenan was charged with first-degree aggravated assault under 18 Pa. C.S. § 
2702(a)(1), but he entered a plea to second-degree aggravated assault under 18 Pa. C.S. § 
2702(a)(4).  Section 2702(a)(1) covers a wide range of offenses, from intentionally 
attempting to cause serious bodily injury to recklessly causing it, some of which offenses 
are considered not to be crimes of violence.  For this reason, under the categorical 
approach § 2702(a)(1) does not qualify as a crime of violence, United States v. Mayo, 901 
F.3d 218, 239 (3d Cir. 2018).  Second-degree aggravated assault under § 2702(a)(4) 
covers assaults with a deadly weapon and does qualify as a crime of violence.  
4 See United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (holding 
that in order to preserve a procedural error for appeal and to avoid plain error review, the 
defendant must raise the objection when the sentence is imposed; this permits a judge “to 
immediately remedy omissions or clarify and supplement inadequate explanations” and 
provides judges with “contemporaneous notice of errors” and “the opportunity to correct 
them”).   
5 Even if we were to review the District Court’s decision de novo, our holding would 
remain the same because the District Court did not err, as explained below.  
6 United States v. Brown, 849 F.3d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 2017).  
7 See United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 352 (3d Cir. 2011).  
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The District Court committed no legal error.  It correctly calculated the applicable 
Guidelines range, allowed both parties to present arguments as to what they believed the 
appropriate sentence should be, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and documented its 
reasoning.   
Although the District Court did not specifically mention Keenan’s anomaly 
argument for a sentence to be reasonable, the court need only “demonstrate that [it] gave 
meaningful consideration to” the relevant § 3553(a) factors but need not “otherwise 
discuss and make findings.”8   
Here, the District Court noted Keenan’s specific arguments about both a variance 
and departure.  The court clearly articulated that “a downward departure under 4A1.3 is 
not warranted” and as for “a variance, nothing in this record suggests that a reduction in 
sentence is the appropriate course here.”9  The court further demonstrated its 
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors when it stated that its sentence balanced the 
“defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for his crime, with . . . the very serious nature 
of this offense, his extensive criminal history, his career offender status, and the needs for 
just punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation.”10  The District Court cited Keenan’s 
prior criminal history to demonstrate that he had the propensity for recidivism given that 
                                              
8 United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007).  
9 App. 161.  
10 App. 160.  Although a District Court’s general statement that it had “considered all 
the § 3553(a) factors” is not enough to show meaningful consideration of a specific 
argument, Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 259, we find the District Court’s application of the 
factors to Keenan sufficient to demonstrate meaningful consideration of them. 
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“the instant federal offense was the defendant’s second federal conviction for bank 
robbery in the past seven years.”11 
The District Court therefore articulated reasons sufficient to assure the public and 
parties that the sentencing process was a reasoned process and addressed Keenan’s 
sentencing arguments. 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence. 
                                              
11 App. 161.  
